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Suppose we could create an exact physical replica of a living human being - 
exactly like him cell for cell, molecule for molecule, atom for atom. Such a 
replica would be indistinguishable, at least physically, from the original. For 
we are supposing that the replica is a perfect physical copy in every detail. The 
idea of such a replica, whether artificially created or naturally found, is a per. 
fectly coherent one; in fact, it is consistent with all known laws of nature. 
The idea of  course is a commonplace in science fiction. 
Given that your replica and you are exactly alike physically, will you also 
share your psychological life with it? Will your replica have your psychologi. 
cal traits and dispositions, intellectual powers and artistic gifts, anxieties and 
depressions, likes and dislikes, and virtues and vices? Will it feel pain, remorse, 
joy and elation exactly in the way you do? That is, if two organisms have 
identical physical features, will they be identical in psychological characteris. 
tics as well? 
According to many moral theorists, any two things sharing the same 
'naturalistic' or 'descriptive' features cannot differ in respect of moral or 
evaluative properties. Thus, it has been said that if St. Francis is a good man, 
anyone who is just like him in all naturalistic respects - in this case, broadly 
psychological properties, such as traits of character and personality - must of 
necessity be an good man. This relationship between moral properties and 
nonmoral properties is often called 'supervenience': moral properties are said 
to be supervenient upon nonmoral properties just in the sense that any two 
things that coincide in all nonmoral properties cannot diverge with respect to 
any moral properties. The concept of supervenience is easily generalized so 
that we may speak of the supervenience relation for any two families of 
properties (or events, predicates, facts, etc.). 1 Briefly, a set F of properties is 
supervenient upon a set G of properties with respect to a domain D just in 
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case any two things in D which are indiscernible with respect to G are neces- 
sarily indiscernible with respect to F (that is to say, any two things inD are 
such that necessarily if they differ with respect to F then they differ with res- 
pect to G). 2 We may call F 'the supervenient (or supervening) family' and G 
'the supervenience base'. 
The problem about the shared psychological life of persons and their 
physical duplicates can be given a perspicaceous reformulation in terms of 
supervenience: Are psychological properties (events, processes, etc.) super- 
venient upon physical properties (events, processes, etc.)? Psychological 
supervenience, if it obtains, would give us one important sense in which the 
physical determines the mental: once the physical side of our being is com- 
pletely fixed, our psychological life is also completely fixed. Since the 
physical obviously does not supervene upon the psychological, this deter- 
mination is asymmetric: the physical determines the psychological, but the 
psychological does not determine the physical. Thus, psychophysical superveni- 
ence is one possible way in which the psychophysical relation can be charac- 
terized; and beyond this it has implications for various problems in the 
philosophy of mind such as the traditional mind-body problem, psychophys- 
ical reduction, and the possibility of psychophysical laws. We will touch on 
some of these issues below; 3 however, our chief concern will be the question 
what reason there might be for accepting the thesis of psychophysical super- 
venience. 
Lest you think that an affirmative answer to the question of psychophys- 
ical supervenience automatically yields physicalism, let me remind you that 
G. E. Moore, to whom the thesis of moral supervenience is often attributed, 
was a staunch and generally effective critic of ethical naturalism, the thesis 
that moral properties are definable by, or reducible to, naturalistic properties; 
in spite of his beleif in the supervenience of the moral upon the naturalistic, 
he was an advocate of the autonomy of ethics and the irreducibility of ethics 
to natural science. It is possible that Moore was inconsistent in holding these 
positions, but the inconsistency is not apparent or obvious; it would need to 
be demonstrated. Similar comments apply to psychophysical supervenience 
and physicalism. If Moore was consistent, then by symmetry of reasoning the 
doctrine of psychophysical supervenience ought to be compatible with the 
denial of physicalism. 4 
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I believe that most of  us are strongly inclined to accept the doctrine of psy- 
chophysical supervenience in some form. Your replica is not only a person, 
but a person who is psychologically indistinguishable from you. He will share 
your beliefs, memories, likes and dislikes, wants and aversions, hopes and des- 
pairs; his internal life, as well as his external life, will be just like yours. As we 
shall see presently, there are psychological states you and your replica will 
not share, but the strong intuition prevails that some form of psychophysical 
supervenience must hold. 
In a recent paper, s Stephen P. Stich considers a form of psychophysical 
supervenience. The thesis he considers, and which he endorses, is the follow- 
ing, called by him "the principle of psychological autonomy": "The properties 
and relations to be invoked in an explanatory psychological theory must be 
supervenient upon the current, internal physical properties and relations of 
organisms ''6. We can put this more simply thus: "Explanatory psychological 
properties and relations are supervenient upon the current internal physical 
properties of organisms". Stich, however, does not discuss in any detail 
reasons for or against this thesis of supervenience, his chief concern in the 
paper being the implication of this thesis for the belief-desire model for ex- 
planations of actions. We will later defend a thesis of psychophysical super- 
venience similar to Stich's, but let us begin by considering a broader and 
stronger form of the supervenience doctrine. 
(A) All psychological states and processes supervene on the contem- 
poraneous physical states of the organism. 
Two points of explanation: the qualification 'contemporaneous' is intended 
to indicate the requirement that if a certain psychological state occurs at a 
time, then that state is supervenient upon a physical state (or class of physical 
states) of the organism occurring at the same time. The point of this qualifica- 
tion will become clear when we examine some apparent counterexamples to 
the thesis as stated. Second, by 'physical state' we have in mind what may be 
called 'internal physical state'; that is, we want to exclude so-called 'relational 
properties' of  the organism, such as its distance from the moon at a given 
time, its being larger than this typewriter, etc. It is not a simple matter to give 
a precise meaning to 'internal'; but the relative looseness of this and other 
notions we are making use of here will not affect our discussion. Third, when 
we speak of 'states' and 'events', we sometimes have in mind 'generic states' 
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and 'generic events' - that is, types such as pain, itch, and belief that a stitch 
in time saves nine; at other times, we may be referring to concrete, dated 
instatiations of these generic events and states. In any particular case the con- 
text should make clear which sense is intended, although in many contexts 
these terms can be read in either of the two senses. 
Why should anyone think (A) is true? At one point, many philosophers 
believed something like what Wolfgang K6hler and others called "psycho- 
physiological isomorphism", 7 which, for our present purposes, could be 
stated as follows: 
The Psychophysical Correlation Thesis: For each psychological 
event M there is a physical event P such that, as a matter of law, 
an event of type M occurs to an organism at a time just in case an 
event of type P occurs to it at the same time. 
The principle affirms the existence of a pervasive system of laws, of bicondi- 
tional form, linking each mental event with some physical correlate, presum- 
ably some neurological state or process. Evidently, the Correlation Thesis 
implies the supervenience thesis (A) - assuming that the modality involved 
in the concept of supervenience is satisfied by the nomological modality in 
the statement of the Correlation Thesis. Thus, anyone who accepts the 
Correlation Thesis would be committed to the doctrine of psychophysical 
supervenience. 
However, I think it would be wrong to think of the Correlation Thesis as 
providing evidence for the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. For one 
thing, there are those who accept supervenience but not the Correlation 
Thesis, the latter being a stronger claim than the former. 8 Second, if there is 
an evidential relation here at all, the idea of psychophysical correlation 
should be seen as grounded in a belief in supervenience, and not the other 
way around; it seems to me that the belief that there must be laws connecting 
psychological events with physical events is derived from the general belief in 
the supervenience of the former on the latter, although a demonstration of 
this evidential priority would be a complex matter. In any event, the question 
of the possible support the Correlation Thesis might offer for psychophysical 
supervenience is made moot  by the fact that most philosophers today would 
reject the Correlation Thesis. 
There are various arguments in the recent literature in the philosophy of 
mind intended to refute the Correlation Thesis. One of the most influential 
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of these, advanced by the proponents of 'functionalism', runs as follows: Any 
mental state, such as pain, can be 'physically realized' in many diverse types 
of organisms and physical structures (e.g., humans, molluscs, crustaceans, 
perhaps Martians and robots) so that, as a matter of empirical fact, it is 
extremely unlikely that some uniform physical state exists to serve as its 
physical correlate. Creatures whose physicochemical structures are entirely 
different from our own, or from anything we know on this earth, may yet be 
'psychologically isomorphic' to us in the sense that the same psychological 
theory is true of them. Roughly speaking, this means that their observable 
behavior is best explained by imputing to them certain internal states which 
are interconnected among themselves, and to stimuli and behavior, in the way 
psychological states are so interconnected for humans. And yet the bioche- 
mistry of these creatures may be so different from ours that there is no sense 
in which we may speak of 'the same physical state' underlying, say, pain for 
both humans and these creatures. We may call this 'the multiple realization 
argument'. 
This is not the place to discuss the merits of this argument; the only point 
I want to make here concerns the possibility of psychophysical laws, given 
the multiple realizability of psychological states. First of all, notice that the 
multiple realization argument implies nothing about the general impossibility 
of psychophysical laws; at best, it shows the impossibility ofpsychophysical 
laws of a certain form (completely general biconditional laws of  the form ~ /  
iff P', where M is a general kind of a mental state and P is a 'single' physical 
state). In fact, it is a tacit assumption of the argument that there are species- 
specific psychophysical laws, that is, laws connecting, say, pain with a certain 
neural correlate for each biological species. Indeed, the very notion of 
'physical realization' of pain seems to presuppose the existence of nomological 
connections, within each species, between pain and some underlying neural 
process. If there were no such nomological link, in what sense does this 
neural state, and not some other one, 'realize' pain? And how would we know 
that it, and not some other state, is the physical realization of pain for this 
species? Similar comments apply to the talk of electronic-mechanical devices 
'realizing' certain 'logical states' or psychological states. Thus, the existence 
of species-specific psychophysical laws of the following form is not only 
consistent with the multiple realization argument but in fact presupposed by 
it: 
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Each human is such that it is in pain at a time if and only if it is 
in physical state P at the time. 
Each mullusc is such that it is in pain at a time if and only if it is 
in physical state Q at the time .... 
It is in virtue of these lawlike connections that the state P can be said to 
realize pain in humans, that Q realizes pain in molluscs, and so on. 
The implications of these species-specific psychophysical laws for the 
question of psychophysical supervenience are clear. Even if the multiple 
realization argument refutes the unrestricted doctrine of psychophysical 
correlation it has no tendency to refute a more limited correlation thesis, 
one that asserts the existence of a physical correlate, within each species, 
for every psychological event. In fact, this thesis of species-restricted psy- 
chophysical correlation appears to be an implicit commitment of the multi- 
ple realization argument, and hence of the functionalist position. To derive 
psychophysical supervenience from the restricted psychophysical correla- 
tion thesis, the only additional assumption needed is the self-evident propo- 
sition that if two organisms or structures are physically indistinguishable 
from each other, then they belong to the same species. Replicas of humans 
are humans; replicas of felines are felines; and replicas of Martians are also 
Martians. 
Thus, it is clear, in general, that various forms of the psychophysical cor- 
relation thesis logically entail the supervenience thesis. But this in itself is 
as one would expect, and provide little enlightenment concerning the question 
of evidence for psychophysical supervenience. For, as observed earlier, super- 
venience seems more fundamental, metaphysically and methodologically, 
than correlation, and although evidence for the Correlation Thesis is likely 
to be also evidence for supervenience, it would be pointless to argue to 
supervenience from correlation. A more interesting question is whether 
supervenience itself entails the Correlation Thesis, or if not then at least 
the existence of some psychophysical laws. 9 Let us now consider some spe- 
cific putative counterexamples to the supervenience thesis (A), postponing 
till later more general evidential considerations. 
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Obviously, my replica and I do not share all properties in common. For 
example, we cannot be in the same place at the same time; I was born of 
natural parents, but he wasn't; I have siblings but he has none; I have lived 
in Ann Arbor for over ten years but he hasn't; I will be alive in 1984 but 
perhaps he won't be. These properties that we do not share may not strike 
us as very significant, but they are properties nonetheless. The philosophi- 
cally interesting problem is whether the properties that I do share with my 
replica include significant properties - significant in some clear and definite 
sense. That is, the interesting problem for us is what significant psychological 
properties are supervenient on physical properties. Let us consider some 
psychological properties that apparently are not supervenient. 
(A) I remember being strafed by a jet fighter in a war over twenty years 
ago. My replica thinks he remembers this, too; in fact, he claims to have 
nightmares about this, and his mental imagery of the event is as vivid as mine. 
But of course he remembers no such thing, and the strafing is not part of his 
life experience. I also know and truly believe that I was strafed by a fighter 
plane, but my replica has no such knowledge, or true beliefJ ~ 
(B) I am thinking of  Vienna. We put my replica in the same brain state, 
and he has the visual imagery that I am having - say, that of an old church 
I was fond of visiting when I was in Vienna some years ago - and is thinking 
the same thoughts that I am thinking (how hot and humid that summer was 
in Vienna,...). And he  shares my tendency to speak of Vienna (or at least to 
utter sentences containing the word 'Vienna' at dinner parties). Is he also 
thinking of Vienna? I do not think so. When I have a certain sort of visual 
imagery and thinking certain thoughts, that counts as 'thinking of Vienna' 
because of a certain historical and cognitive relationship that I have with the 
city Vienna, a relationship that my replica lacks. To see this more clearly, 
think of a person who is having the very same phenomenological visual 
imagery that I am having, but who has never been to Vienna and has never 
heard of it, and whose visual image, which is qualitatively indistinguishable 
from mine, can be traced to a church in his hometown in Iowa. We would 
hardly say of this person that he is now thinking of Vienna. These points 
can be made with regard to other examples: liking or disliking some particular 
person; wanting some particular object; fearing some particular object or 
event. It  is important to see that while wanting to eat this particular ham- 
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burger is similar to thinking of Vienna in the respect we are presently inter- 
ested in, wanting to eat some hamburger or other is not. The latter would be 
supervenient upon brain states. 
(C) I am glad that I was invited to the Dean's party last week, but am 
still embarrassed that I could not remember the first name of the Dean's 
wife. Notice that if I am glad that such-and-such is so-and-so, then not only 
must I believe that such-and-such is so-and-so, it must be the case that 
such-and-such is so-and-so; and similarly if I am embarrassed that such- 
and-such is so-and-so, then it must be true that such-and-such is so-and-so. 
I f  Jones falsely believes that he has won a fellowship we cannot truly say 
Jones is glad that he won a fellowship. My replica, therefore, cannot be said 
to be glad that he was invited to the party or embarrassed that he could not 
recall the hostess' name. Similar comments apply to many other states of 
feeling and emotion. 
(D) I see a tree. My replica has not emerged from the laboratory, but his 
brain is put in the same state that obtains when I see a tree. So he is having 
a 'treeish sense-datum', just like mine. But he is not seeing a tree. Two 
persons or organisms can be in the same state - the same appropriate neural 
state - but one may be seeing, touching, etc. a tree, and the other not. 
(E) Finally, let us consider actions - especially, actions that presuppose 
social contexts - networks of social practices, customs, and institutions. I am 
signing a check to pay off my mortgage. We put my replica in the same brain 
state and give him a blank check. He puts his (my?) signature on it, a signature 
that no expert from the bank could distinguish from mine. But is he paying 
off his mortgage? Is he even signing a check? He does not have a bank account, 
not to mention a mortgage. The answer, I think, is that he is not doing any of 
these things; he is not signing a check, and he is not paying off any mortgage. 
He cannot do these things because he is not as yet a full member of the social 
community whose institutions and practices make these actions possible. His 
being in appropriate internal physical states is not enough to enable him to 
engage in these acts. 
iv 
How shall we handle these cases? Some of these cases can be handled by 
removing the requirement that every mental state or event supervene on 
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contemporaneous physical states; obvious examples include remembering. 
We could say that an instance of remembering occurring at a certain time 
does supervene on physical states but not on the synchronous ones, not on 
those occurring at the time the remembering takes place, but rather on a 
longer temporal stretch o f  the physical history of the organism that does the 
remembering. My Doppelgfi;nger on Twin Earth does remember being strafed 
by a fighter plane, although my replica does not, and this is because the 
former, not the latter, has a life history similar to mine. Certain other cases 
discussed in the preceding section can be dealt with by enlarging the spatial 
scope of the supervenience base, by taking the trees seen, tables touched, 
and the person liked or disliked, in the supervenience base, but this is to 
go beyond the intended spirit of  the thesis of  psychophysical supervenience. 
I think it is important to be able to defend a form of the thesis that does 
not go outside the organism, a thesis that claims psychological states to be 
supervenient on the internal physical states of the organism. 
I would suggest the following procedure. We first define the notion of an 
'internal property' or 'internal state' of a thing, and then defend the following 
two theses: 
The Supervenience Thesis: Every internal psychological state of 
an organism is supervenient on its synchronous internal physical 
state. 
The Explanatory Thesis: Internal psychological states are the 
only psychological states that psychological theory needs to 
invoke in explaining human behavior - the only states needed for 
psychology .11 
The full defense of these theses would be a major task; however, I hope to 
be able to say enough about them to make them plausible. 
First, what is 'an internal state' or 'internal property'? In Person and 
ObJect, 1~ R.M. Chisholm introduces the notion of a property rooted out- 
side the time at which it is had: 
G is rooted outside times at which it is had = def- Necessarily 
for any object x and for any time t, x has the property G at t 
only i fx  exists at some time before or after t. 
The idea is straightforward: G is rooted outside the times at which it is 
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had just in case the possession of G by an object implies the existence of 
the object at a time other than the time at which it has G. Thus, consider 
some examples: taking the second vacation in the Rockies, taking the first 
of the two walks today, being twenty years old, being divorced, being a 
future president, and so on. A psychological example is remembering: for you 
now to remember a thing, you must have existed before. In analogy with this 
notion, we can define another: 
G is rooted outside the objects that have it = def.. Necessarily 
any object x has G only if some contingent object wholly distinct 
from x exists. 
The qualification 'contingent' is inserted because according to some philoso- 
phers there are 'necessary beings', beings that exist in all possible worlds. 
The qualification that the object other than x be wholly distinct from x is 
intended to exclude proper parts of x. If  G is the property of being spheri- 
cal, then if any object has G, then it follows necessarily that there is some 
object different from x, namely a spatial part of x. But this should not dis- 
qualify G from being an internal property. It will be seen that the notion we 
are after here corresponds, roughly, to the traditional notion of 'relational 
property'.  
We now define 'internal': 
G is internal = def.. G is neither rooted outside times at which 
it is had nor outside the objects that have it. 
We may say that an event or state is an internal event or state of an object 
just in case it is the object's having an internal property at a time. So if G 
is an internal property, an object's having G or being G at a time is an internal 
event or state. An internal process would be a causally connected or continuous 
series of internal events or states involving the same objects or objects that are 
in some way connected or continuous with one another. 
The Supervenience Thesis as stated concerns only internal psychological 
states, namely those psychological states whose occurrence does not imply 
anything about the past or future, or anything existing other than the 
organism or structure to which the states occur. Brief reflection should con- 
vince us that these are the states we should be concerned with. 13 Let us look 
at the series of counterexamples we presented earlier against the broader, 
unrestricted thesis of psychophysical supervenience. 
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Consider the group (A). Remembering is not internal. I f  a person now re- 
members anything, that entails he existed before now; so remembering does 
not come under the purview of the Supervenience Thesis. Nor does knowing 
or believing truly: if I know, or believe truly, that the moon is round, it 
follows that a contingent object, namely the moon, exists. 
What of believing? It is now customary to distinguish between belief de 
re and belief de dicto, although the precise import of  the distinction is still 
controversial) 4 Roughly speaking, de dicto belief is believing a certain 
proposition, a dictum, to be true, while de re belief is believing o f  some 
object, a res, that it is thus and so. Belief de dicto will in general be internal 
states. The belief that the tallest man is a spy does not entail the existence of 
a tall man or a spy; the belief that ghosts are malevolent does not entail the 
existence of ghosts. On the other hand, belief de re is plausibly viewed as 
noninternal when the object of belief is other than oneself. If  a given belief 
is de re with respect to a certain object, then this object must exist if that 
de re belief is to exist. You cannot have a belief about Mt. Everest unless Mr. 
Everest exists - and unless, furthermore, you are in a certain historical- 
cognitive relation to i t J  s However, belief de se, a special case of belief de 
re, is internal; my belief that I am now sitting entails the existence of no con- 
tingent object other than myself. I think the internal-noninternal split for 
beliefs corresponds to the division between those beliefs which we expect 
to supervene on bodily states and those for which we do not have such expec- 
tations. 16 
Group (B) is analogous to belief de re. If, as we argued, thinking of Vienna 
involves as an essential ingredient some historical-cognitive contact with the 
city Vienna, it fails to be internal as defined: my thinking of Vienna is 
'rooted outside' in both of  the senses that were considered. The same goes for 
other de re psychological attitudes, such as liking and disliking, fearing, 
admiring, and expecting, except when these attitudes are de se. 
Some items in group (C) will be internal and some noninternal: my being 
pleased that Johnson has been elected to be city council will be non-internal, 
but my being pleased that I am now thinking will be internal. My being 
pleased that I did twenty pushups this morning is of  course noninternal. I 
believe we can expect the internal states in this group to be supervenient. 
Items in group (D), involving perceptual relations to external objects, will 
in general be noninternal: I cannot see or touch a tree unless a tree exists, 
and I cannot see or touch this particular tree unless this particular tree exists. 
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Also, actions requiring societal contexts, the items in group (E), are nonin- 
ternal; they presuppose the existence of persons in certain social relations, 
social institutions, and the history of these things, if these actions are to be 
performed. 
The Supervenience Thesis concerns only those psychological states or 
properties that are internal in our sense, and claims that they are supervenient 
upon the cotemporaneous internal physical states of the organisms to which 
they occur. A moment's reflection should convince us that those who believe 
that our mental states are determined by the physical processes occurring in 
our bodies could not have nonintemal states in mind. It is not that these non- 
internal states are not purely psychological, or that they have some non- 
psychological mixtures; 1~ my remembering that I had a severe headache 
yesterday is noninternal, although it presumably has no nonpsychological 
components. It is just that they go beyond what is here and now in the psy- 
chological space of the organism. The notion of a replica of a person as we 
have used here is a time-bound notion: something is a replica of me now but 
not a replica of me as I was ten years ago or as I will be ten years hence. 
On the other hand, some psychological states or events that occur to me now 
spill into other times and places, as it were. Remembering spills into the past; 
knowing into other places and times. In many cases, this is due to the so- 
called intentionality of  the mental, although intentionality probably does not 
i 
give us a general explanation of this phenomenon. So we cannot expect all 
my current psychological states to depend, or supervene, upon my current 
internal physical states. 
There are two general ways of dealing with these apparently nonsuper- 
venient psychological states: first, we can, as we have done, restrict the 
class of psychological states for which supervenience is to be claimed; second, 
we can broaden the supervenience base - in our case, the class of physical 
states - to accommodate the apparent exceptions. Thus, as previously 
noted, some instances of remembering could be handled by broadening the 
supervenience base to include a person's past physical history; in terms of 
the concept of a physical replica, this would amount to strengthening this 
concept so that a replica must match the original over a stretch o f  time, so 
that my replica must have qualitatively the same physical history that I have. 
To handle de re psychological states, we would need to broaden the super- 
venience base to include physical states of  objects outside the organism; and 
ultimately we would need to speak of possible worlds, as Terence Horgan 
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does, in formulating the thesis of  psychophysical supervenience: 8 We could 
say, following Horgan, that any two possible worlds that are indistinguishable 
with respect to physical details are indistinguishable from the psychological 
point of  view, or, more briefly, that any two worlds that are physically in- 
distinguishable are in fact one and the same world. This form of generalized 
supervenience thesis is of  broad metaphysical interest, but its implications 
for specific problems concerning the mental are more difficult to guage than 
is the case with a thesis that is formulated in terms of individual organisms 
and their psychological states. 
This is one reason why the philosophical interest of  the Supervenience 
Thesis needs to be shown, and this is the task of the Explanatory Thesis. 
As may be recalled, the Explanatory Thesis affirms that psychological theory 
needs only to invoke internal psychological states in formulating explanations 
of  human behavior. We now turn to this claim. 
In support of the Explanatory Thesis we shall try to make plausible the follow- 
ing claim: the causal-explanatory role o f  any noninternal psychological state 
can be filled by some internal psychological state. I f  this is true in general, 
then it will follow that no reference needs to be made in psychological theory 
to noninternal psychological states. Let us begin with knowing or believing 
truly. As we saw, these are noninternal. I know that if I turn this knob coun- 
terclockwise the burner will go on. Since I want the fire to go on, I turn the 
knob. My knowledge that turning the knob will cause the burner to go on 
plays a causal role in the explanation of my action of turning the knob. This 
is a simple and familiar sort of  action explanation. It is clear, however, that 
knowledge is sufficient but not necessary to construct an action explanation: 
belief, or firm belief, is also sufficient. If  I believe that the burner will go on 
if the knob is turned, then I will turn on the knob if I have the desire to have 
the burner go on (assuming that there is no countervailing desire). In fact it 
is only the element of  belief in knowing that is causally productive of the ac- 
tion. Similar comments apply to believing truly. My truly believing that some- 
thing is so is not more efficacious in producing actions than my merely believ- 
ing that something is so. As Stich says, "what knowledge adds to belief is 
psychologically irrelevant". 19 
It is true that whether or not my action succeeds in bringing about the 
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intended result normally depends on whether the belief involved is true. Thus, 
whether my action results in the burner being turned on depends on whether 
my belief that it would go on if the knob is turned is correct. However, it is 
not part of the object of psychological explanation to explain why the burner 
went on; all it needs to explain is why I turned the knob. It might be objected 
that not only did I perform the action of turning the knob but I also per- 
formed that of  turning on the burner, and that this latter action does involve 
- it logically entails - the burner's going on. This is correct; however, the ac- 
tion of turning on the burner, insofar as this is thought to involve the burner 
going on, is not an action that it is the proper business of psychological theory 
to explain or predict. The job of psychological explanation is done once it has 
explained the bodily action of turning the knob; whether or not this action 
results in my also turning on the stove, my starting cooking the dinner, my 
starting a house fire, and so on is dependent on events and facts quite outside 
the province of psychology, and are not the proper concern of psychological 
theory. Only basic actions, not 'derivative' or 'generated' actions, need to be 
explained by psychological theory .2o 
We now turn to remembering. Memory turns out to be noninternal for 
two reasons: first, it implies something about the past, and second, in most 
cases, like knowing, it implies the existence of something other than the 
rememberer. When a person firmly believes that he remembers but fails to 
remember in virtue of the failure of one or the other of  these two conditions, 
then we may assume there obtains in him some internal state which is just 
like a genuine case of  remembering except for one of these conditions failing 
to obtain. This internal state may be some phenomenological experience, 
~nemory image' or belief about the past characterized by what Russell called 
the 'dej/l-vu' quality; but depending on how remembering or memory is con- 
strued, it need not be any sort of  conscious experience. This residual element 
of remembering, when remembering has been stripped down to an internal 
psychological state, may be called 'seeming to remember'. My claim would be 
that this seeming remembrance can do all of the explanatory work done by 
remembering. Thus, when I act in a certain way in part because of my remem- 
bering a certain thing, then under the same circumstances my replica will act 
in the same way because of his seeming to remember the same thing. Whether 
or not his seeming remembrance is a genuine case of remembering will not af- 
fect his behavior. This seems plausible when we reflect that remembering 
affects our behavior often as a source of belief, that seeming to remember is 
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to remembering as believing is to knowing, and that, as we saw, insofar as 
behavior is concerned, belief is psychologically as efficacious as knowledge. 
The foregoing exemplifies our strategy in defense o f  the Explanatory 
Thesis. The strategy is to argue that within each noninternal psychological 
state that enters into the explanation o f  some action or behavior we can lo- 
cate an 'internal core state' which can assume the causal-explanatory role 
of  the noninternal state; we would in fact argue that this internal core is the 
causal and explanatory core of  the noninternal state. It is in virtue o f  this 
core that the noninternal state has the psychological explanatory role that it 
has. 
But why should we believe that there is such an internal core to every ex- 
planatory psychological state that is noninternal? Causal considerations o f  the 
following general sort make such an assumption both attractive and plausible. 
In constructing a psychological explanation o f  a piece of  behavior, we are 
attempting to ascertain a psychological causal antecedent o f  that behavior. 
Considerations o f  causal contiguity and continuity lead to the belief that the 
proximate cause of  the behavior must be located within the organism emit- 
ting the behavior - that is, there must be a proximate causal explanation of  
that behavior in terms of  an internal state of  the organism. Why should we 
think that there must be an internal psychological state which will serve as 
proximate cause o f  behavior? This is a difficult question, but part o f  an answer 
is contained in the observation that if this internal state has all the causal 
powers of  the corresponding noninternal psychological state in the produc- 
tion o f  behavior, then there seems to be no reason not to think of  it aspsy- 
chological as well. And in many cases we can identify the internal psychologi- 
cal core of  a given noninternal psychological state, as we have done above for 
knowing and remembering. 
With this in mind, let us turn briefly to the remaining cases. When we see 
a tree, there is some internal phenomenal state going on; some internal re- 
presentation o f  the tree will be present in us. In the language of  the sense- 
datum theory, we are sensing a tree-ish sense datum, or we are appeared to 
tree-ishly. The Explanatory Thesis would claim that whether there is an actual 
tree out there, or whether we are just having this internal presentation, makes 
no difference to the behavior emitted. In either case we may reach out for the 
real or imagined tree, answer 'Yes' when asked 'Do you see a tree?' and so 
forth. We finally come to actions. Let us return to the case o f  my replica's 
signing a check. The observable action he performs is the same as mine when 
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I sign a check and pay off the mortgage, even though his observable physical 
action does not issue in signing a check and mine does. But it is clear that the 
succes or failure of  our undertaking here is not really up to us; once the ap- 
propriate physical action has been performed, it is not up to us whether that 
action issues in the signing of a check or the paying off of  the mortgage. Th.at 
depends on factors outside our immediate individual control, These nonbasic 
actions do not come within the purview of psychological theory; all a psycho- 
logical theory of behavior needs to explain and predict is the basic actions 
individuals perform. Societal actions are generally nonbasic; they are produced 
by the basic actions that we perform, normally the basic bodily movements 
we can perform at will. 
V I  
In this final section we retum to the question whether there are any positive 
reasons for thinking that psychological states - at least, the internal ones - 
supervene on physical states. I shall present one argument for psychophysical 
supervenience, and it runs as follows. First of all, I propose that we accept, in 
the present context, the functionalist conception of psychological states as 
those internal states which serve as intermediary states mediating between 
stimuli and behavior output. 21 This is the argument: 
(1) My replica and I share all our current internal physical properties. 
This premise is given ex hypothesi,  namely, by the description of the situa- 
tion to the effect that the replica is an exact physical copy of my body. 
(2) But this does not mean that, at eacht and every instant, we share 
the same occurrent, physical properties. 
This is evident. After the replica was created, we are going to have different 
sensory input, and engage in different activities; while I am typing, he is out 
playing tennis. 
(3) We do share structural, dispositional properties. Our basic physi- 
cal structure is ident ica l -  at least for n o w -  and we share the 
same physical powers, capacities, and dispositions. 
(4) One type of such dispositional properties would be the property 
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of responding in certain characteristic ways to different types of 
internal or external stimuli. Thus, my replica and I share the same 
system of stable lawlike relationships of the following form: 
stimulus $1 ---* behavior output O1 
stimulus $2 ~ behavior output 02 
(5) Now the question arises how we are to explain these particular 
input-output relationships. This question arises because these 
particular patterns of input-output connection are not necessarily 
shared by other human beings (although of course we expect 
there will be similarities). 
Typically, such explanations will proceed by positing certain internal states 
to mediate the particular input with the particular output associated with 
that input. Different organisms differ in the output they emit when the same 
input is applied because their internal states at the time are different. We now 
come to perhaps the most controversial assumption of this argument, the 
functionalist interpretation of psychological states: 
(6) These internal states posited to explain sensory input-behavior 
output relationships are psychological states. 
This is the functionalist conception of a psychological state: a psychological 
state is a 'functional state' that connects sensory inputs and behavior output 
in appropriate ways. 
(7) If a series of psychological states, along with their mutual inter- 
connections, are posited as the best explanation of the input- 
output connections in my case, then, in methodological consis- 
tency, the same psychological states must be posited in case of 
my replica. For he and I share the same input-output connections. 
This is something like a 'generalization argument' in moral theory. I think 
that there clearly is a similar consistency requirement in the case of  scientific 
methodology, and (7) is well justified. Of course, (7) is what needs to be estab- 
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lished, viz. that my replica and I share the same psychological properties. 
Thus, it follows: 
(8) If two organisms or structures are physically identical, then their 
psychology is also identical. If two organisms coincide in the set 
of physical properties, they cannot diverge in the set of psycho- 
logical properties. The psychological supervenes on the physical. 
This completes the argument. 
The leading idea of the argument is exceedingly simple: since my replica 
and I share the same input-output relations, and psychological states are just 
those states posited to explain these relations, the same psychological states 
must be posited for both of us. As was noted, the most obvious point of con- 
troversy in this argument is the functionalist interpretation of psychological 
state used at step (6). I hesitate to accept this conception of psychological 
state as a general characterization valid for all psychological states. 22 A fun- 
damental question not touched by this argument is whether conscious (phe- 
nomenological) states, such as raw feels, visual images, and the like, are super- 
venient on bodily states, although this remark will be disputed by those who 
fully accept the functionalist account of psychological states. In any case, it 
is difficult to see what a general argument showing the supervenience of the 
phenomenological would look like. There may of course be broad metaphysical 
considerations in favor of physicalism from which the supervenience of 
phenomenological states could be derived. Also, the continuing discovery of 
lawlike connections, however rough and crude, between phenomenological 
experience and brain processes serves as limited but indispensable empirical 
evidence. The only reasonable thing to say at this point, I think, is the rather 
tame and unsurprising remark that the belief in psychophysical supervenience 
seems to be based on broad metaphysical and methodological considerations, 
which are yet to be spelled out, buttressed by what empirical evidence there 
is for specific psychophysical correlations. 2a 
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